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NOTES
NOT-so-INFORMED CONSENT: USING
THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
TO PROMOTE STATE-SUPPORTED
OUTCOMES
Over the past several decades, the informed consent doctrine has
become a staple of our health care system, creating a monumental
shift in the way we practice medicine. For much of our medical
history, the Hippocratic Oath to "do no harm" meant doctors
paternalistically determined what they believed to be the appropriate
course of treatment for their patients.' Now, instead of simply
following the will of their doctors, patients generally prefer to take a
more active role in their health care, deciding which treatments, if
2
any, are most appropriate for their individual circumstances.
The informed consent doctrine highlights patient autonomy as its
core value, emphasizing the importance of providing patients with the
medical information needed to make a treatment decision that is both
fully informed and in accordance with the patient's beliefs and
priorities.3 Although both the common law and its later statutory
embodiment set baseline standards for the types of information to be
provided, the informed consent doctrine has traditionally left doctors
significant leeway to determine the appropriate treatment information

see MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL
AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 41 (2003) ("For years, medical paternalism-the belief
that doctors should make decisions for patients-ruled.").
2 See JESSICA W. BERG, PAUL S. APPELBAUM, LISA S. PARKER & CHARLES W. LIDZ,
INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 26-27 (2d ed. 2001).

3 Id. at 24-26; see also id at 25 ("Although a person cannot autonomously choose an
option she does not understand, usually patients can be provided with information relevant to
their treatment decisions, in terms that they can comprehend, so they can decide whether to
authorize implementation of a treatment plan.").
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to share with their patients and how best to convey it. 4 Ideally, the
process is one that promotes the type of thoughtful and effective
communication between a patient and her physician that ultimately
allows the patient to realistically and objectively balance the risks and
benefits of a proposed course of care.
The relatively recent development of informed consent statutes for
specific procedures, however, seems to have upended the traditional
notion of informed consent. Instead of promoting autonomous choice,
these statutes mandate that doctors provide particular disclosures
about certain procedures. In addition, rather than providing patients
with objective information, some of these statutes appear to provide
patients with slanted information that pushes them toward a
predetermined "right" choice.6 This is especially true with abortion,
which, as a hot-button issue, has received a great deal of legislative
attention with regard to specific informed consent requirements.
Given recent developments in the courts, this attention is only likely
to increase.9
Specific informed consent statutes, though purportedly intended to
enhance informed consent and protect patients when physicians fail to
4 See id. at 40-64 (describing the historical development of general informed consent
requirements through common law, the resulting standards of disclosure, and the lingering
ambiguity as to the exact scope of the disclosure necessary under these standards).
5 See id. at 315 (identifying the theoretical goal of the doctrine as allowing patients to
utilize a "rational decisionmaking process" that promotes more informed health care decisions
"in accordance with patients' values").
6 See Rachael Andersen-Watts, The Failure of Breast Cancer Informed Consent Statutes,
14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 201, 203-04 (2008) ("These laws do not promote individualistic
decision-making. In fact, they stem in part from the assumption that individual women were
making an 'incorrect' [treatment] decision [by choosing mastectomy over lumpectomyl. This is
not merely the law overstepping its role by proffering medical advice, but moreover it is a
perversion of the goal of informed consent." (footnotes omitted)).
7 See Chinud Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical
Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, GUTrMACHER POL'Y REv., Fall
2006, at 6, 11 ("[P]olicymakers and public health officials frequently disregard the basic
principles of informed consent in favor of furthering a highly politicized antiabortion goal.").
Despite the seeming inconsistency of such action in light of traditional informed consent, the
Supreme Court has readily acknowledged a state's ability to use its regulatory power "in
furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote
respect for life." Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007). That the Court has condoned
such action does not negate the fact that the statutes are contrary to the original spirit of
informed consent.
8 See Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the
Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV., Fall 2007, at 6, 8-9.
9 See, e.g., id. at 13 ("With the Court having signaled its willingness to accept
requirements aimed at influencing rather than informing a woman's decision, as well as those
premised on data that have not been fully vetted by or are outside of the scientific consensus, the
signs are ominous indeed."); Matthew Gordon, State Attempts to Expand Abortion Informed
Consent Requirements: New Life After Gonzales v. Carhart?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics 751 (2007)
(discussing how Carhart may lend support to two state bills that would expand informed
consent requirements in the abortion context).
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provide the appropriate level of information, have often failed to
bring about the desired improvements.1o With abortion statutes, some
state legislatures have gone even further, creating statutes that
dispense with the need to provide objective information, and instead
impose a clear moral prerogative to manipulate women's ultimate
decisions regarding the procedure." In some cases, these statutes
have even gone so far as to force doctors to provide information in a
way that is not only undesirable, but also potentially misleading or
inaccurate. To make matters worse, rather than examining such
statutes to determine whether they have any scientific or medical
basis, courts, including the Supreme Court, have become increasingly
deferential to the legislature, even in the face of blatant misstatements
of fact.12 As a result, instead of enhancing informed consent by
providing a more educated patient base, these statutes undercut the
traditional goals of the doctrine in favor of greater legislative say in
patient action. 1 3
This Note argues that there is no place for medically unfounded
statutes that interfere with the doctor-patient relationship by posing as
requirements for informed consent. Although it is questionable
whether legislatures should be creating statutory informed consent
requirements for specific procedures under any circumstances,
statutes without scientific foundation are especially problematic. The
Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will provide an overview of the
history of informed consent, along with a discussion of some

10See Andersen-Watts, supra note 6; see also infra notes 27-30

and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008) (providing a script for doctors
that requires them to refer to the fetuses as a "human being" and forces them to warn patients of
potentially severe side effects that, as discussed below, have little, if any, scientific basis); see
also Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 375-79 & 375 n. 112 (2008) (noting sixteen states' passage of
legislation providing for mandatory ultrasound for women seeking abortions and commenting
that "[a]lthough couched in the protective terms of informed consent, these statutes are
unabashedly meant to transform the embryo or fetus from an abstraction to a baby in the eyes of
the potentially aborting mother").
12 See, e.g., Carhart, 550 U.S. at 174-76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing that
Congress disregarded statements from numerous physicians and medical organizations that
disagreed with its ultimate findings, noting that "[m]any of the Act's recitations are incorrect,"
and concluding that Congress did not carefully consider the evidence in arriving at its findings);
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2008)
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's decision to uphold an informed consent
statute that requires physicians to inform abortion patients about likely nonexistent long-term
emotional harms without examining the scientific validity of the legislature's questionable
findings).
13 Arguably neither the judiciary nor the legislature is adequately equipped to direct the
doctor-patient relationship to a level of detail that essentially specifies the way medicine should
be practiced. When the legislature oversteps its bounds, however, the judiciary would be remiss
not to serve as a more stringent check on legislative ambition to ensure that informed consent
remains both true to form and constitutionally valid.
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concerns raised by specific informed consent statutes. Part H will
provide a discussion of the seminal cases that inform judicial
interpretation of these statutes in the abortion context. Part Ill will
look at the more controversial cases and statutes that have arisen in
the wake of Gonzales v. Carhart.Finally, Part IV will propose a more
stringent standard of review to be used by courts in evaluating
contested informed consent legislation. The proposed standard of
review will incorporate a closer examination of the scientific
foundation underlying specific informed consent statutes that gives
greater deference to the views of the scientific and medical
communities at large, rather than deferring to legislative
determinations of medical fact. Such review is imperative to maintain
the integrity of informed consent given legislatures' increasing
proclivity to misuse scientific or medical information to achieve a
particular, typically political, end.
I. INFORMED CONSENT BY STATUTE: HISTORY AND CONCERNS

Informed consent came about "to ensure that each patient gets the
information she needs to meaningfully consent to medical
procedures." 4 It "purported to solve medicine's paternalism," seeking
to overcome the fact that "doctors too often dictat[ed] treatments
rather than discussing options."1 5 Informed consent is often looked at
as a patient right; its ultimate goal is "to allow patients to pursue their
own conceptions of good" and "to safeguard their own subjective
welfare."1 6 Though all decisions are, to some extent, affected by
outside influences, the informed consent process ideally limits such
influences to allow patients the autonomy necessary to best pursue
these goals.' 7
Courts have been largely responsible for creating concrete
requirements for physicians obtaining patient informed consent.' 8
14 Andersen-Watts, supra note 6, at 201; see also Linda P. McKenzie, Federally Mandated
Informed Consent: Has Government Gone Too Far?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 267, 272 (2007) ("The
underlying public policy [of informed consent] is to ensure that patients have sufficient facts for
making health care decisions.").
15 Andersen-Watts, supra note 6, at 201.
16BERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 26-27; see also Richardson & Nash, supra note 7, at 6
("[linformed consent is both a legal obligation and an ethical principle.... [EJmbedded in the
idea [is the principle] that individuals should be empowered to make autonomous decisions
regarding their own care.").
17 See BERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 25 (discussing the spectrum between decisions based
on influences that have so overwhelmed the patient as to compromise the patient's autonomy,
and decisions based on independent deliberation of significant and relevant information). "The
ethical mandate for society and its institutions is to promote, as much as possible, the conditions
that enable individuals to make substantially autonomous decisions." Id.
18 Id. at 41.
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State legislatures have played a relatively minor role, in many cases
merely codifying the common law requirements. 9 Their combined
efforts have created two prevailing requirements: "the historical
requirement that physicians obtain patients' consent before
proceeding with treatment, and the more recent requirement that
physicians disclose such information to patients as will enable them
to participate knowledgably in making decisions about treatment." 2 0
The ultimate goal is to create a process that provides patients with all
material information regarding the nature of the procedure, its risks,
alternatives, and anticipated benefits. While laws embodying these
requirements generally leave it to physicians to determine the
appropriate level of disclosure, 2 1 a few statutes do require specific
disclosures for certain, extremely serious risks generally recognized
as associated with a given procedure.22
In a few contexts, more specific statutory informed consent
requirements have come about largely to address perceived
disconnects in communication between physicians and their patients.
Legislators working directly or indirectly 23 to enact specific informed
consent statutes often do so out of concern that, for certain
procedures, physicians simply are not providing their patients with all
of the necessary information.
Breast cancer statutes, for example, came about in response to
perceived physician overuse of the radical mastectomy and underuse
of breast-conserving surgery (also known as lumpectomy) when
treating early-stage breast cancer.24 The statutes generally require
physicians to give patients specific information by providing
comprehensive brochures, creating an affirmative duty for physicians
'9 Id.
20 Id.

21 See Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An
Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 407, 426-27 (1980) (discussing common
disclosure elements and noting that courts have not required disclosure of risks that are either
very unlikely or very common).
22 The American Medical Association's Model Informed Consent Law, for example,
would require consent in writing, disclosure of the general nature of the proposed medical
procedure, and disclosure of "the known risks, if any, of death, brain damage, quadriplegia,
paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any organ or limb, or disfiguring scars . . . with the
probability of each such risk if reasonably determinable." Id. at 560 n.898 (quoting 236 JAMA
1010,1011 (1976)).
23 In a few cases, rather than undertaking such legislation directly, states have authorized
medical panels to identify treatments and procedures that require more particularized informed
consent, and enumerate specific disclosure requirements. BERG ET AL, supra note 2, at 58. While
such systems may make informed consent more precise, "they are contrary to the spirit of the
informed consent doctrine," and that "[tiheir effect is to depersonalize the physician-patient
relationship . . . in the name of enhancing patient autonomy." Id. "This," they argue, "is a
serious problem." Id.
24Andersen-Watts, supra note 6, at 204.
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to orally disclose certain treatment alternatives, or both.25 Whether
written or oral, the mandatory disclosures usually consist of an
objective discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the
various treatment options, and typically do not recommend one form
of treatment over another.26
The breast cancer statutes have had, at best, marginal success.
Though intended to address a lack of proper communication between
patients and physicians, many of them instead have "gummed up the
works even further by giving cookie-cutter, often lackluster, medical
27 While the laws certainly increase the likelihood that
advice ....
patients will receive more comprehensive information about their
treatment options, it is not clear that this flood of information actually
benefits patients in any significant way. The information required by
these statutes, especially in brochures, varies significantly in terms of
relevance, especially for patients whose breast cancer is at an early
stage.28 Coupled with research demonstrating notable differences in
how patients absorb and respond to information from their physicians,
this creates a significant possibility "that legislation on disclosure of
treatment options may complicate the decision-making process, rather
than enhance it, by imposing a decision-making style that may be
inappropriate for a majority of breast cancer patients." 2 9 Inundating
patients with information in this way also assumes that those patients
want the information in the first place, which is not always the case.30
Specific informed consent statutes related to abortion have gone
even further astray from the original principles of informed consent.
Like the breast cancer statutes, these also attempt to inundate patients
with information regarding the procedure through oral physician
disclosures or state-sponsored materials. 3 1 Unlike the breast cancer
statutes, however, the goal is not always to provide comprehensive
and objective knowledge. On the contrary, these statutes are
transparently in place to deter women, if at all possible, from
2 See Susan G. Nayfield et al., Statutory Requirements for Disclosure of Breast Cancer
Treatment Alternatives, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1202, 1203-04 (1994).
26

Id. at 1204.

Andersen-Watts, supra note 6, at 209; see also BERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 35 (stating
the authors' skepticism of a "one size fits all process" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Meisel & Kabnick, supra note 21, at 430 ("[W]e view such a statutory scheme, in which the
extent of the required disclosure depends upon a predetermined list of procedures and their
risks, as implicitly characterizing the doctor-patient relationship as mechanical rather than
human.").
28 See Nayfield, supra note 25, at 1203-04 & tbl.2.
27

29

30

Id. at 1207.
See GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 96-100 (indicating that patients are often

reluctant to receive relevant information regarding their health conditions).
31 See infra notes 33, 106-13 and accompanying text.
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choosing abortion. Abortion informed consent statutes require
disclosure of specific risks in a way that is unlike the risk disclosure
required for any other medical procedure.3 2 Most problematically,
some of these enumerated risks have little or no scientific basis.3 3
Unlike the breast cancer statutes which, though possibly undesirable,
are not legally objectionable, some of the abortion statutes have
crossed the line differentiating permissible and impermissible uses of
informed consent.
As a preliminary matter, there are numerous reasons why specific
informed consent statutes may not be a good idea. The American
Medical Association has long opposed them, 3 4 and while this is
certainly not dispositive as to the statutes' merit, it does speak to the
fact that the medical profession, in general, believes that the process
of informed consent falls more appropriately within the realm of the
individualized physician-patient relationship.35 These problems are
compounded when the accuracy of such statutes is seriously called
into question.
When the state forces doctors to provide it, the inaccurate or
incomplete information detailed in some of these statutes undermines
the physician-patient relationship and the informed consent process as
a whole. Informed consent is supposed to be "a process through
which accurate and relevant information is presented to a patient so
that he or she is able to knowledgeably accept or forgo medical care,
32 See Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in
Abortion Law, 76 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1599, 1614-15 (2008) (arguing that "the law's treatment
of informed consent to abortion is unusual, to say the least," and noting that "[t]hrough their
mandatory disclosure laws, state legislatures expand the informed consent doctrine to
incorporate information that goes beyond what is mandated in other medical situations").
33 See Gold & Nash, supra note 8, at 9, 11. As discussed later in this Note, the broader
scientific community does not recognize risk of breast cancer and psychological turmoil from
abortion. Despite such evidence, statutes in seven states mandate that physicians (either orally or
by providing written materials) disclose only negative emotional responses-in some cases
grossly exaggerated-instead of correctly describing the range of possible emotional responses.
Id. at 9 (describing statutes in Michigan, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
and West Virginia). Two of these states also mandate that physicians inaccurately portray risks
to future fertility. Id. (South Dakota and Texas). Finally, six states inaccurately inform patients
of a possible breast cancer link, despite the fact that such a link has been categorically
disproven. Id. (Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia).
3 See Richardson & Nash, supra note 7, at 7.
35See Andersen-Watts, supra note 6, at 211, 214 ("Legal informed consent sets standards
for physician disclosure that do not address the needs of patients because no patient is the
generic ideal that the law has invented."). She goes on to note that "while physicians may be
well aware of still-existing problems in communicating with their patients, they are
understandably wary of the law's ability to improve things by usurping the doctor's role . . . ."
Id. at 214. But cf Nayfield, supra note 25, at 1206 (noting that despite their initial controversy,
the breast cancer legislation has generally received a positive reception by physicians, but also
recognizing the possibility that these laws "set a precedent for further (and more problematic)
legislative incursions into the patient-physician relationship").
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based on an appreciation and understanding of the facts presented." 36
As Professor Robert Post noted, "when physicians speak to us as our
personal doctors, they must assume a fiduciary obligation faithfully
and expertly to communicate the considered knowledge of the
'medical community.'" 37 If the state has the ability to manipulate this
information to fit political ends, there is significant cause for concern.
According to a report by the Guttmacher Institute, as of 2006, seven
states "mandate the provision of negative and unscientific information
about abortion and its implications," either by supplying doctors with
a script or by requiring doctors to provide state-sponsored brochures
to patients seeking abortions.38 As a result, patients may begin to
question the quality of the information presented. If they cannot trust
their doctors, where else can these patients turn? 39
Despite these shortfalls, states are continuing to develop specific
informed consent statutes. Though the Supreme Court has ruled that
these statutes are a valid exercise of legislative ability to regulate the
medical profession,40 this ability should not be without limits. After
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,41 many
states followed Pennsylvania's lead in crafting specific informed
consent statutes mandating the information a physician must provide
to a woman before performing an abortion. 4 2 As of 2007, thirty-one
states had enacted such requirements.4 3 In fact, the development of
such statutes has become another potent tool in the arsenal of abortion
opponents."
Since Gonzales v. Carhart,45 another wave of legislation that
further promotes expansion of mandated informed consent has been
making its way through the country.4 6 These latest informed consent
36Richardson & Nash, supra note 7, at 6.

31Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A FirstAmendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939,977.
38 Richardson & Nash, supra note 7, at 7.
39 See Gregory D. Curfman et al., Physiciansand the FirstAmendment, 359 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 2484 (2008) (arguing that a patient's awareness that her physician's words are state
mandated may lead to distrust that significantly strains the physician-patient relationship).
40 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (evaluating the risk
disclosures in an informed consent statute and concluding "[w]e see no constitutional infirmity
in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here"); see
also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) ("Under our precedents it is clear the State
has a significant role to play in regulating the medical profession.").
41 505 U.S. 833.
42 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 751 (noting that, in Casey's wake, many states have
increased the amount of information physicians must disclose to patients seeking abortions).
43 Id.
4 See, e.g., David C. Reardon, Informed Consent: The Abortion Industry's Achilles'
Heel, http://www.afterabortion.org/PARIV2/n2/INCONSNT.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
45 550 U.S. 124.
46 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 751.
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statutes are taking greater liberties with scientific fact and asking
courts to turn the other cheek in the name of judicial deference.4 7
When legislatures begin tampering with scientific fact and going
against the recommendations of the majority of the medical
community, such legislative exercise is no longer legitimate. This
recent development of scientifically questionable informed consent
statutes in the abortion context highlights the pressing need to draw a
firm line between allowable and non-allowable uses of informed
consent.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC INFORMED CONSENT
STATUTES

Among the more recently enacted abortion informed consent
statutes, a few are beginning to push the boundary between
permissible informed consent legislation and requiring physicians to
convey unscientific, state-approved ideology. To better understand
the development of these statutes, it is useful to look at a couple of
seminal cases that shaped the evolution of courts' analysis in this
area.
A. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
Prior to Casey, courts generally prohibited mandatory disclosure
laws that deviated from traditional notions of informed consent, even
for abortions.4 8 For the most part, courts required states to follow the
common law doctrine "in which physicians were expected to disclose
to individual patients [the] medical facts relevant to the interventions
they were considering." 4 9 Statutes that attempted to surpass the
boundaries of the common law doctrine by requiring doctors to
provide additional, more slanted information were struck down.o
This all changed with the Supreme Court's decision in Casey in 1992.
In Casey, the Court upheld an informed consent statute that
required doctors to provide specific information to patients before
performing an abortion, including the nature of the procedure, the
health risks of abortion and childbirth, the probable gestational age of
47 See Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion
Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 223, 253 (2009) ("[P]ost-Casey decisions
have permitted 'informed consent' statutes that are neither truthful nor factually
non-misleading.").
4 See Dresser,supra note 32, at 1606.
49 Id. at 1606-07.
50 See Manian, supra note 47, at 34 (discussing Supreme Court and lower court decisions
regarding the validity of abortion-specific informed consent statutes in the period after Roe v.
Wade but before Casey).
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the fetus, the availability of state printed information, the existence of
agencies that provide alternatives (such as adoption), and the father's
financial liability.5 ' Casey established that the government may
require "the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information" about a
medical procedure.5 2 In upholding the informed consent statute, the
Court contended that, despite the rigid requirements, the statute did
not interfere with physician judgment because it excused physicians
from providing information in cases in which disclosure could have
an adverse affect on the patient's physical or mental health.53
The Court argued that it is acceptable for the state to create
regulations that "express profound respect for the life of the
unborn," 54 as long as those regulations do not create "undue burden"
on a woman's right to choose.55 An undue burden exists and
invalidates a law only if that law's "purpose or effect is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
According to the Court, information that is truthful
abortion ....
does not constitute such a burden, so requiring a
nonmisleading
and
physician to provide information about the nature of the procedure, its
risks and those of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the
fetus was permissible. In fact, the Court further surmised that
mandating such information actually "reduc[es] the risk that a woman
may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully
informed."5 1
Contrary to the majority's belief, Justice Blackmun asserted that
the statute was clearly an imposition on physician judgment. He
argued, "[lrigid requirements that a specific body of information be
imparted to a woman in all cases, regardless of the needs of the
patient, improperly intrude upon the discretion of the pregnant
woman's physician and thereby impose an 'undesired and
uncomfortable straitjacket.' 5 9 Justice Blackmun maintained that
requiring physicians to provide such information is "the antithesis of
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992).
Id. at 882.
5 See id. at 883-84.
54 Id. at 877.
55 Id.
5 Id. at 878.
5 See Manian, supra note 47, at 251 (noting the contradiction inherent in requiring
truthful and "nonmisleading" information that is biased in nature). To point out this paradox,
Manian asks, "If the abortion-specific 'informed consent' regulation must be 'nonmisleading,'
how can the Court permit the regulation to be biased in one direction?" Id.
5 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
5 Id. at 934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetrics &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986)).
51
52
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informed consent" and that in reality, it serves no legitimate interest,
and merely advances the state's view of abortion "under the guise of
informed consent."6
Discussing Casey's lasting significance, Professor Maya Manian
notes, "Casey marks a turning point where abortion law explicitly
began treating women as decision-makers less capable than other
competent adults. It permitted the State to impose biased information
when women are choosing to reject the traditional role of
motherhood." 6 1 It is therefore unsurprising that in Casey's wake,
legislatures began "alter[ing] the informed consent doctrine to a
degree that is unprecedented." 6 2 Traditionally, the informed consent
doctrine never required physicians to inform patients of health risks
that were unrecognized by the expert medical community at large.63
Since Casey, however, legislatures have increasingly designed
statutes that mandate either disclosure of obscure risks or risks that,
despite legislative findings to the contrary, have little or no basis in
4 the Court
science. With its holding in Gonzales v. Carhart,6
expressly condoned this practice, a move that will allow states to push
the boundaries of informed consent even further. 65
B. Gonzales v. Carhart
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court upheld a statute
banning "partial-birth abortion."66 Though the case did not deal
specifically with an informed consent statute, the law at issue did rely
heavily on scientific findings by Congress. The case established that
60 Id. at 936 (stating further that the required information "goes far beyond merely
describing the general subject matter relevant to the woman's decision" and arguing that the fact
that the state does not "compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of necessary surgery or
of simple vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion character of the statute and its real purpose"
(quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763, 764) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
61 Manian, supra note 47, at 252.
62 Dresser, supra note 32, at 1617.
63 Id. at 1618. Dresser also notes two other distinctions between abortion informed
consent and the traditional doctrine: traditional informed consent does not require physicians to
provide graphic information regarding the procedure, nor does it require physicians to make
moral judgments about the patient's treatment decision. Id. at 1617-19.

550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Cf Manian, supra note 47, at 226 (discussing the impact of the Court's decisions in
Casey and Carhart).Manian asserts:
6s

The Casey opinion characterized women as incapable decision-makers in need of the
State's "protection" provided through biased information disguised as "informed
consent" legislation. Abortion law's divergence from traditional informed consent
law culminated in Carhart,which turned established informed consent doctrine on
its head by completely denying women's capacity to give consent to treatment.

Id.
6

550 U.S. at 168.

216

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1

states may use their regulatory powers to allow or ban particular
procedures to further "its legitimate interests in regulating the medical
profession in order to promote respect for life..... 67 It is no stretch
to apply this same logic and level of deference to statutes regulating
informed consent.
Carhartis problematic for a number of reasons. For one, Justice
Kennedy referred to a fetus as both a baby and an unborn child,
stating that "by common understanding and scientific terminology, a
fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is
viable outside the womb." 6 8 According to one author, such claims
could easily "pave the way for a court . .. to find that the status of a
fetus as a baby is now a 'truthful and non-misleading' fact rather than
an 'unsettled medical, scientific, and theological issue."' 69 Secondly,
in a strikingly paternalistic move, the Court declared that "[w]hile we
find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice
to abort the infant life they once created and sustained."70 As a result,
the Court determined that state has an interest in making sure that
such a decision is "well informed."7 1
The Court maintained that "[w]hen Congress undertakes to act in
areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative
options must be especially broad."72 Such deference is problematic
given the rapidly changing nature of science and the law's inability to
keep up with such frequent and sweeping changes. In this case, the
Id. at 158.
Id. at 147.
69 Gordon, supra note 9, at 752. This is exactly what happened in the Eighth Circuit,
where the court upheld a South Dakota statute requiring doctors to make a statement to this
effect. See discussion infra Part 111.Because of the Eighth Circuit's ruling, North Dakota is
poised to follow suit, having proposed a similar statute that defines an embryo or fetus as a
"separate, unique, living human being" from the moment of conception. H.R. 1445, 61st Leg.
(N.D. 2009).
70 Carhart,550 U.S. at 159. As Professor Manian points out:
67
6

In no other area of healthcare does the State override a competent adult's right to
consent to a medical procedure that falls within the bounds of proven and accepted
medical practice, and in fact may be physically safer for the patient, based on the
State's unsubstantiated view that the treatment will be psychologically harmful to the
patient.
Manian, supra note 47, at 225.
7' Carhart,550 U.S. at 159. The Court also states that "[tihe State's interest in respect for
life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, the medical
profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a
decision to elect a late-term abortion." Id. at 160. Despite this statement, the Court makes no
assessment as to whether the statute would actually serve such a purpose. In fact, the state is
hardly advancing its interest by promoting dialogue; instead, it is simply removing the option
for women to even have the procedure of which it disapproves.
72 Id. at 163 (quoting Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)).
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Court deferred to congressional findings that the prohibited procedure
is never necessary.7 3 This was despite contrary opinions by three
district courts that illustrated the biased nature of the congressional
findings and highlighted many physicians' conclusions that for
certain women, "partial-birth abortions" are actually safer than the
alternative procedure.74 These district court opinions spanned "a
combined 700 pages and recount[ed] exhaustive medical testimony
regarding

the range

of abortion

procedures

.

. . pointedly

condemn[ing] Congress for its biased 'fact-finding' process and
conclusions."75 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg also argued that the
congressional record did not support Congress's finding of a medical
consensus against the banned procedure, and determined that, in fact,
the bulk of the evidence demonstrated the opposite.76 For example,
despite Congress's conclusive finding that "partial-birth abortion is
never medically indicated," 77 the congressional record contained
reference to statements by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, which stated that "[e]specially for women with
particular health conditions, there is medical evidence that [the
procedure being banned] may be safer than available alternatives."
Thus, on this point alone, the Court's willingness to simply defer to
such a severely defective fact-finding process sets a troublesome
precedent.
HI. COERCION OR CONSENT?

Since Carhart,a few legislatures have taken even more leeway in
their fact-finding processes. Presumably, they assume that, like in
Carhart,courts will continue to defer despite significant deficiencies
7 Id. at 176, 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recognizing Congress's finding that the
procedure is never medically necessary despite the presence of significant conflicting
information in the congressional record, and concluding that "[a]lthough Congress' findings
could not withstand the crucible of trial, the Court defers to the legislative override of our
Constitution-based rulings").
7 Gordon, supra note 9, at 753; see also Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D.
Neb. 2004); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
7 Cynthia Dailard, Courts Strike 'Partial-Birth' Abortion Ban; Decisions PresageFuture
Debates, GUTrMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y, Oct. 2004, at 1.
76 Carhart,550 U.S. at 176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]here was no evident consensus
in the record that Congress compiled. There was, however, a substantial body of medical
opinion presented to Congress in opposition. If anything . . . the congressional record establishes
that there was a 'consensus' in favor of the banned procedure." (quoting Carhart v. Ashcroft,
331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1008-09 (D. Neb. 2004)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
n Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(0), 117 Stat.
1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §1531 (2006)) (emphasis added).
78 149 CONG. REc. S 12,917 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
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in their statutes' medical bases. South Dakota has the statute with
perhaps the most problematic lack of scientific foundation. The
statute mandates that physicians inform patients of the following
information twenty-four hours before performing the abortion:
(b) That the abortion will terminate the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being; (c) That the pregnant
woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human
being and that the relationship enjoys protection under the
United States Constitution and under the laws of South
Dakota; (d) That by having an abortion, her existing
relationship and her existing constitutional rights with regards
to that relationship will be terminated; (e) A description of all
known medical risks of the procedure and statistically
significant risk factors to which the pregnant woman would
be subjected, including: (i) Depression and related
psychological distress; [and] (ii) Increased risk of suicide
ideation and suicide.
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v.
Rounds,so the circuit case upholding the biological disclosures in the
statute, is equally problematic. Initially, the district court granted a
preliminary injunction based on Planned Parenthood's claim that the
statute violates physicians' First Amendment rights to be free from
compelled speech, as well as concerns about the statute's use of the
term "human being." 8' The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, set aside
the injunction, determining there was no constitutional violation
"where physicians merely were required to give 'truthful,
nonmisleading information' relevant to the patient's decision to have
an abortion." 8 2 The court also cited Carhart for its assertion that
"[tihe government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to
show its profound respect for the life within the woman." 83 The
Eighth Circuit determined that, taken together,
7 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §34-23A-10.1 (2008). But see Richardson & Nash, supra note 7,
at 8 (stating that the "implication that abortion is psychologically riskier than carrying an
unwanted pregnancy to term is misguided, as the most methodologically sound research
conducted over the past two decades does not find a causal relationship between abortion and
severe negative mental health outcomes" and that "the best indicator for a woman's mental
health after an abortion is her mental health before the abortion").
- 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
81 Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887-88 (D.S.D. 2005),
vacated by 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
8 Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
882 (1992)).
83 Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007)).
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Casey and [Carhart] establish that, while the State cannot
compel an individual simply to speak the State's ideological
message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a
physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information
relevant to a patient's decision to have an abortion, even if
that information might also encourage the patient to choose
childbirth over abortion.8
The court did not critically evaluate the legislative findings or
determine the validity of the scientific information mandated by the
legislature's script for physicians. Instead, it deferred to the
legislature's determination that it is "scientific fact" that an embryo or
fetus is a separate, unique human being from the moment of
conception, thereby finding the disclosure to be a valid exercise of the
state's power to regulate medicine. The Eighth Circuit decision did
not even address the dubious statements regarding mental health
implications.
Interestingly, two recent comprehensive reviews of the scientific
literature seeking to identify a causal link between abortion and
mental health concluded that, based on the best available evidence, no
such link exists.86 In one of these reviews, a team of researchers from
Johns Hopkins University reviewed twenty-one high-quality studies
on the subject. The studies, which involved over 150,000 women,
determined there is no significant evidence to support the existence of
adverse mental health outcomes in women who sought abortions
versus those who elected other alternatives in the face of unwanted
pregnancies. The researchers also found that the studies with the
most reliable methodologies tended to have neutral findings with
"few, if any, differences between aborters and their respective
comparison groups in terms of mental health. . . .,89 The studies with
the most flawed methodologies, on the other hand, "consistently
found negative mental health sequelae of abortion." 90 The researchers
concluded that "[p]rograms and policies based on claims derived from
Id. at 734-35.
Id. at 727-29.
See Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental Health Outcomes: A
Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436 (2008); BRENDA MAJOR ET AL.,
84
8
8

REPORT

OF THE APA

TASK FORCE ON

MENTAL

HEALTH

AND ABORTION

(2008),

http://www.apa.org/releases/abortion-report.pdf.
r Charles et al., supra note 86, at 438; see also Abortion Not Seen Linked with
Depression,REUTERS, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUSTRE4B30
UE20081204.

88 Charles et al., supra note 86, at 448-49.
Id. at 448.
9 Id. at 449.
8
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flawed research should be modified to reflect the most scientifically
sound literature," and that "the enforcement of so-called 'informed
consent' laws (which often provide misinformation regarding mental
health risks of abortion) is unwarranted based on the current state of
the evidence." 1
A report by the American Psychological Association (APA)
similarly concluded that many studies attempting to link abortion with
mental health issues are methodologically unsound.9 2 The researchers
determined that "the prevalence of mental health problems observed
among women in the United States who had a single, legal,
first-trimester abortion for nontherapeutic reasons was consistent with
normative rates of comparable mental health problems in the general
population of women in the United States." 93 Though the report
recognized that some women feel sadness, grief, and feelings of loss
after terminating a pregnancy, there was no evidence sufficient to
support a causative link between the abortion procedure and those
feelings.94 In fact, the report noted that "[a]cross studies, prior mental
health emerged as the strongest predictor of postabortion mental
health."9 5
Unlike the majority in Rounds, which took the legislative findings
at face value, the four dissenting judges seemed to support the view
that the statute should be evaluated with an eye toward its scientific
merit. Judge Murphy, who authored the dissenting opinion, noted that
South Dakota's informed consent statute goes "far beyond" those
previously upheld. She argued that a "constitutionally significant
difference between regulation of verifiable fact as opposed to
metaphysical belief-between neutral information and subjective
idea-has been well recognized by the Supreme Court,"9 7 and
maintained that "[t]he script physicians are compelled to give . . .
incorporates a value judgment and therefore escapes scientific
verification." 9 8 Citing Carhart'sproposition that, despite a general
deference to legislative fact-finding, courts have a duty to review such
findings when constitutional rights are at issue, Judge Murphy clearly
91 Id.

92 MAJOR ET AL., supra note 86, at 5-6.

9 Id. at 6.
94Id. (noting the likely predictive value of factors such as personal characteristics and
prior mental health problems as indicative of negative mental health outcomes following an
abortion, or for that matter, any other stressful life event).

9 Id.
9 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 739-43 (8th Cir. 2008)
(en banc) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 742.
9 Id. at 746.
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favored a lower level of deference under the circumstances
presented. 99 She argued that, rather than providing factually accurate
medical information aimed at facilitating the patient's informed
choice, the statute instead imposes subjective value judgments on
physicians and their patients, an act the dissent argued was a
constitutional violation.

Judge Murphy also distinguished the psychological distress and
suicide risk disclosures in the abortion statute from the risk disclosure
requirements in commonly accepted informed consent statutes. She
noted that typical informed consent statutes "entrust[] the
communication of particular medical risks to the doctor's best
professional judgment."' 0 In contrast, the specific risk disclosures for
women undergoing abortion "undercut[] a physician's best medical
judgment and discretion,"l02 especially in light of the significant
evidence demonstrating that the disclosures at issue were medically
unsound.103
Promisingly, on remand, the district court declared the unfounded
suicide risk disclosures unconstitutional." Citing the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the APA, and the dearth
of evidence to demonstrate that suicide ideation and suicide are
generally recognized risks, the court concluded that "the suicide
disclosure language of the statute is untruthful and misleading." 05
Time will tell whether the Eighth Circuit upholds the decision on
appeal.
Although South Dakota's statute is undoubtedly the most
egregious, numerous other states have passed, or are in the process of
passing, legislation that similarly incorporates medically unsound
information. In Texas, for example, a physician must disclose "when
medically accurate . . . the possibility of increased risk of breast

cancer following an induced abortion and the natural protective effect
of a completed pregnancy in avoiding breast cancer."06 This
9 See id. at 752. Interestingly, despite the Court's statement regarding non-deferential
review of issues involving constitutional rights in Carhart, the CarhartCourt did not review
Congress's fact-finding in the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act with any additional scrutiny.
10Id. at 753.
01
Id. at 750.
0 Id.
103Id. (noting a 2006 congressional report on the subject, which concluded, "there is
considerable scientific consensus that having an abortion rarely causes significant psychological
harm" (quoting MINORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
DIv., 109TH CONG., FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY
FUNDED PREGNANCY REsouRcE CENTERS I1 (Comm. Print 2006))).
" Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D.S.D. 2009).
10Id. at 983.
16TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(1)(B)(iii) (Vernon 2008).
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requirement is in place despite numerous studies indicating that such
a risk is never medically accurate, as the link between breast cancer
and abortion does not appear to exist. 1" Likewise, in Minnesota,
Mississippi, and Montana, the decision to abort is considered
informed only if the physician has described the "particular medical
risks associated with the particular abortion procedure to be employed
including, when medically accurate, the risks of infection,
hemorrhage, breast cancer, danger to subsequent pregnancies, and
infertility."os As with the breast cancer risk, these statutes'
suggestion that abortion causes risks to future fertility are generally
inaccurate.'0 Though these statutes are less objectionable because
doctors have slightly more discretion under the "when medically
accurate" language, these are still areas in which legislatures are
writing into law nonexistent medical risks.
Disclosures about the alleged psychological effects of abortion are
also becoming increasingly common. Wisconsin physicians must
orally disclose a risk of "psychological trauma," a claim that suffers
from the same scientific deficiencies as the South Dakota statute's
assertions of suicide and depression risks."o Like South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, and West Virginia mandate that physicians provide
patients with materials that cite either suicide or "postabortion
traumatic stress syndrome" as possible side effects of abortion."' In
addition, a number of states' abortion informed consent statutes cite
as legislative findings" 2 the alleged serious emotional and
psychological consequences of abortion, along with Casey's related
assumption that women elect to have abortions "only to discover
later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision
was not fully informed."ll 3 Given the Eighth Circuit's recent decision
in Rounds, it is certainly not outside the realm of possibility that states
107 See, e.g., NAT'L CANCER INST., SUMMARY REPORT: EARLY REPRODUCTIVE EVENTS
AND BREAST CANCER WORKSHOP (2003), http://www.cancer.gov/cancerinfo/ere-workshop
-report (stating that based on the available evidence, it is well established that "[i]nduced
abortion is not associated with an increase in breast cancer risk").
1o8MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242 (West 2009); see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33
(2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104 (2007).
"9See Gold & Nash, supra note 8, at II (stating that "[t]he overwhelming scientific
consensus . . . is that vacuum aspiration-the most common first-trimester procedure-poses
virtually no long-term risk of infertility, ectopic pregnancy, spontaneous abortion or congenital
malformation," and that, although second-trimester abortion may pose some increased risk, such
complications are unlikely due to medical advances).
0
See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(f) (West 2008).
'" Gold & Nash, supra note 8, at 11.
112See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(A)(5)(c) (2008) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992)); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(1)(a)
(West 2008) (also quoting Casey); see also ALA. CODE § 26-23A-2 (2008).
"3 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
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will further expand their requirements and force physicians to
disclose more detailed information regarding these purported mental
health effects.
States are also beginning to create specific informed consent
statutes that move beyond expanded risk disclosures, pressing
traditional notions of informed consent in new ways. For example,
several states are creating mandatory ultrasound requirements,11 most
of which characterize the fetus as a child, a statement that is political
rather than scientific.' 15 As a result, whether through ultrasound laws
or laws such as those enacted in South Dakota and proposed in North
Dakota," 6 the idea that life begins at conception has been fixed into
law in many states, despite the fact that this is an embodiment of a
philosophical or political ideal, rather than a recognized scientific
precept." 7
4

" Oklahoma recently passed abortion informed consent legislation that requires a woman

seeking an abortion to undergo an ultrasound, regardless of whether it is medically necessary.
See Emily Bazelon, Required Viewing, SLATE, Oct. 22, 2008, http://www.slate.com/
id/2202765/. The statute dictates that the doctor or technician performing the ultrasound must
display the images in the view of the pregnant woman and explain what the ultrasound is
depicting. The law essentially specifies a script, mandating that the physician describe the
heartbeat and the presence of internal organs, fingers, and toes. S.B. 1878, 51st Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Okla. 2008); see also Bazelon, supra. Because of the perceived imposition on the
physician-patient relationship, however, an Oklahoma County district judge granted a temporary
restraining order, preventing the law from going into effect until a lawsuit against it has been
decided. See Tulsa Abortion Clinic Fighting New Law, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 8, 2008, at 13A.
Though the information may not be inaccurate, it is no less of an imposition on the
physician-patient relationship. In fact, them is interesting evidence suggesting that even a
truthful message can be misleading when it inappropriately takes advantage of emotional
influence in order to bias an individual in favor of a particular decision. See Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social Science Research on
Emotionfor Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REv. 1, 1 (2008) (suggesting that, in light of current
social science research, informed consent statutes should be examined more closely, since many
capitalize on emotion to create bias rather than inform free choice). Using recent social science
research, Professor Blumenthal argues that use of negative emotion, such as fear or anxiety, to
portray a particular message causes increased susceptibility to persuasion. See id. at 10-11.
What is more, the higher the credibility of the source, the less likely the listener will perceive
the manipulation and view the information with skepticism. Id. In the abortion context, even
with scientifically accurate information, this creates the potential for an informed consent statute
to become an undue burden on the woman's choice. See id. at 27.
"15 Sanger, supra note 11, at 351. Professor Sanger argues that the "visual informed
consent" is even more objectionable than the terms used to describe the images on the screen.
There are two reasons for this. First, society's perceptions about the ultrasound have made it an
extremely powerful visual tool. Id. Second, and more importantly, these statutes require women
to be complicit in the production of extremely personal images that they prefer not to see. Id.
Combined, these elements create an undue burden to a woman's exercise of her protected choice
regarding whether to abort. Id.
116
See supra note 69.
7
" See Sanger, supra note 11, at 383. In Acuna v. Turkish, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized this divide and declined to impose upon physicians a duty to inform a woman
considering an abortion that the procedure results in "the killing of an existing human being."
930 A.2d 416, 425-26 (N.J. 2007). The court refused to mandate the use of such language,
citing a lack of consensus in the medical community and the inappropriateness of the court
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Under any of these statutes, physicians are free to add commentary
and even suggest their disagreement with the state's position. Such
statements, however, do not avoid the reality that providing doctors
with a state-mandated script flies in the face of traditional notions of
informed consent. In addition, physicians and patients in some of
these states must verify that the patient fully understands the informed
consent information provided.' 18 It is therefore possible that a
physician's stated disagreement with the state-mandated information
could confuse, and therefore nullify, the patient's "informed and
voluntary" consent.1 1 9 Thus, rather than promoting a process, these
states have transformed informed consent for specific procedures into
something more akin to a Mirandal20 warning 21-an approach that
hardly comports with mainstream views about why informed consent
exists and how it is to be used.
More importantly, patients rely on their physicians for advice and
counsel about treatment decisions. If patients begin to question the
source and quality of the information provided by their physicians, it
undercuts the entire patient-physician relationship. Statutes that
require physicians to provide scientifically unsupportable warnings
and statements create situations in which the state "forces physicians
to violate their obligation to solicit truly informed consent-and
thereby detracts from the essential trust between patients and their

driving public policy in an area so enmeshed in "a deep societal and philosophical divide." Id. at
427. The New Jersey court went on to criticize the South Dakota statute at issue in Rounds as
"pushing the doctrine of informed consent to the edge of a new constitutional fault line," by
adopting the "living human being" language without achieving medical or even societal
consensus on that issue. Id. at 427.
118
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-10.1(1) (2008) (requiring a physician to
certify in writing that the patient understood the mandated disclosures).
9
" See Post, supra note 37, at 954.
120Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
121See Emily Bazelon, Script Doctors,SLATE, Aug. 19, 2008, www.slate.com/id/2198114
(quoting South Dakota Attorney General Larry Long as saying: "[i]f I was a lawyer representing
one of these doctors, I'd offer the following sound legal advice: Read the statute to your patient.
It's like the police issuing a Miranda warning."); cf Karene M. Boos & Eric J. Boos, At the
Intersection of Law and Morality: A Descriptive Sociology of the Effectiveness of Informed
Consent Law, 5 J.L. Soc'y 457, 494-95 (2004) (citing a 1982 investigation by the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research as stating the goal of informed consent to be "a tactful discussion, sensitive to the
needs, intellectual capabilities, and emotional state of the particular patient at that time, in terms
that the patient can understand, assimilate, and work with as part of the ongoing
decision-making process") The Commission also made clear that it did not recommend adoption
of specific regulations for informed consent, id. at 478, and that "[p]rofessionals should
recognize, and lawyers and courts should perhaps be reminded, that patients' interests are not
well served by detailed technical expositions of facts that are germane neither to patients'
understanding of their situations nor to any decisions that must be made." Id. at 494 (alteration
in original).
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physicians."l 22 In the face of such negative repercussions to the
integrity of both informed consent and the physician-patient
relationship, courts cannot afford to stand by and defer to legislative
judgments that are not based on sound science or supported by at least
a reasonable segment of the medical community.
IV. THE MERITS OF A LESS DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

Typical informed consent statutes are generally unproblematic.
Most simply require sufficient explanation of a proposed treatment
and its risks, benefits, and alternatives to allow a patient to make an
informed decision. 123 Specific requirements that dictate exactly what
must be included in the physician's disclosure, however, can be more
difficult to assess, and are more likely to create problems of fact or
inappropriately limit the physician's role. 124 This is especially the
case in highly polarized areas such as abortion.
Discussing the misinformation in fetal pain laws, which embody
another increasingly common, but scientifically questionable
"informed consent" requirement, one author suggested, "[t]o the
extent that fact-finding on sharply contested political issues is
inevitably politicized, perhaps heavy judicial deference is
misguided."125 She notes that, in viewing statutes creating specific
informed consent requirements,
the factual question for the court is no longer whether the
facts sufficiently support a particular policy; the adoption and
dissemination of a particular claim as fact is the policy itself
. . . . [W]hether certain issues are serious enough to be
brought to patients' attention is a matter of judgment, but
whether a particular assertion about that issue is accurate is
nothing more than a matter of fact. This is the difference
between policy judgment and simple fact-finding; while

122
Zita Lazzarini, South Dakota's Abortion Script-Threatening the Physician-Patient
Relationship,351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2189, 2189 (2008).
123See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
24
1 See Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent,
Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 149 (2008) ("[T]he more
specific mandated disclosure requirements are, the more problematic they will be. Such specific
statements may require complex qualifications or clarifications to render them truthful and not
misleading. Moreover, specific factual claims in statutes, or even printed materials, are likely to
become dated and inaccurate in light of continuing medical research.").
125Id. at 138-39. Tobin argues that "to the extent these laws go beyond flagging topics that
should be discussed by health care providers and prescribe specific factual claims that must be
conveyed to patients, they should be subject to non-deferential judicial review of their accuracy
and fairness." Id at 114.
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courts should generally avoid the former, they are actually
designed to do the latter.126
This is not to say that courts are any better suited to the task of
deciding the content of informed consent statutes than are
legislatures. In fact, there are arguments in support of the view that
the legislature may be better suited to make such determinations.1 2 7
These arguments assume, however, that the legislature will
exhaustively and objectively use its fact-finding capability to create
statutes that embody the best available medical evidence, and amend
those statutes when the science becomes outdated-assumptions that
simply do not always reflect reality. Given the current state of affairs,
in cases like abortion, there is a substantial argument that legislatures
are "particularly ill suited to [the] task [of objective fact-finding] and
that judges, while not ideally suited to making medical decisions, are
in a better position to weigh the scientific evidence before them." 2 s
In fact, as Professor Jessie Hill argues, when it comes to determining
medical fact, a legislature's "relative institutional competency [is] at
[its] lowest," and courts are actually a better choice.129
Unfortunately, when choosing between institutions in policy areas
like this one, "[t]he choice is always a choice among highly imperfect
,,130
alternatives.
Imperfect as it is, however, "[j]udicial review of
legislation can serve as a means to counteract or deal with political
malfunctions . . . .131 Such malfunctions include the informed
consent statutes at issue here, which arise from preconceived political
ideas rather than legitimate science. Thus, it follows that where the
26

at 137.
See Antony B. Kolenc, Easing Abortion's Pain: Can FetalPain Legislation Survive the
New Judicial Scrutiny of Legislative Fact-Finding?, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 171, 215-16
(2005) (discussing legislative fact-finding strengths, including manpower and funding to
conduct long-term investigations with an eye toward the evolution of medical science, and more
flexibility to adapt without being bound by stare decisis).
28
1 B. Jessie Hill, The ConstitutionalRight to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale
of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 282 (2007).
129
Id. at 339 (noting that one of the main arguments for legislative fact-finding-"that they
are democratic, representative bodies-seems to have no applicability where issues of pure
medical fact are concerned" and that "[u]nlike those cases in which so-called social facts are
involved, there is (or perhaps should be) no significant political element to the determination of
medical fact" (footnote omitted)); see also John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging
Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. CoMMENT. 69, 73 (2008) (arguing for de novo review of the social
facts relevant to a statute's constitutionality through a "transparent and adversarial process").
McGinnis and Mulaney further state: "We reject the notion, which the Court often but
inconsistently deploys, that the judiciary should treat legislative views of the facts more
deferentially than legislative views of the law." Id. at 71.
1 Id.
127

30

NEiL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994).

' Id. at 137.
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legislature abuses its legislative power by manipulating scientific
facts to achieve political ends, uncritical judicial deference to the
fact-finding process is simply not justified. 13 2
Though courts are not the best institution to decide the information
doctors should pass on to their patients regarding a specific
procedure, legislatures are hardly more adept.' 33 Moreover, since
legislatures have become increasingly active in areas traditionally left
to the judgment of physicians, one has to wonder whether the
legislators should be held to the same standard of knowledge as their
physician counterparts.134 From a practical standpoint, it is obviously
impossible to impose such a standard,' 35 but this lack of qualification
has not inhibited increasingly aggressive legislative action in these
areas.
Although courts also lack such training, the deficiency in the
judicial context is arguably not as problematic given the courts'
institutional role of reviewing, rather than writing, these statutes.
Moreover, a relatively new program through the Advanced Science
and Technology Adjudication Resource Center (ASTAR) may help
make judges not only more objective, but also more adept at assessing
scientific and medical information, than most lawmakers. ASTAR's
proposed "judges' medical schools" are designed to provide a crash
course in science and medicine with the hope of ultimately
"developing [a] group of judges who understand enough about the
science of medicine to be better gatekeepers." 36 Such training would
make judges even better suited to the role of reviewing legislative
32

1 See Hill, supra note 128, at 329 (arguing that "deference may be inappropriate when

pure questions of medical or scientific fact are involved").
133 Especially in contentious areas, it seems that legislatures actually have less incentive to
be objective, and fewer procedural checks exist to ensure they do so. See id. at 335 (discussing
the weaknesses behind the theory of legislative deference); see also McGinnis & Mulaney,
supra note 129, at 71 (arguing that "Congress' fact-finding abilities are less capacious and more
biased than those in the judiciary" because Congress is designed to respond to the demands of
constituents and interest groups, whereas the judiciary is better insulated from such subjectivity
and thus has the capacity to perform a more objective factual review).
14See McKenzie, supra note 14, at 273. McKenzie observes:
Politicians are increasingly involved in regulating the content of informed consent.
As such, it follows that any standard governing physicians' level of knowledge must
apply equally to legislators. . . . IT~here is presently no mechanism in place, other
than the democratic process, to ensure that policy makers are adequately informed.
By contrast, a well developed system exists for monitoring physician practice,
including oversight by federal, state, and various private agencies.
35

1 See id.
136

at 273-74.
Amy Lynn Sorrel, Med School for Judges: A Crash Course in Medical Litigation, AM.
MED. NEws, July 28, 2008, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/07/28/prsa
0728.htm (quoting Chief Justice Thomas Moyer of the Supreme Court of Ohio).
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fact-findings that purportedly convey scientific fact. Even in the
absence of such programs, however, courts have no choice but to
serve as a check on legislative ambition when legislators
inappropriately attempt to dictate medical practice using facts that
lack adequate scientific foundation.
Concededly, no medical consensus is required to validate
legislative action.13 7 Thus, it seems inescapable that courts must be
deferential in the face of "reasonable legislative judgments" in cases
where "science has not reached finality of judgment."l 38 This does
not, however, give legislators carte blanche to find a marginally
supported scientific proposition that is opposed by the bulk of the
scientific community and call the issue scientifically uncertain to
justify regulation. In Hendricks, for example, a split between two
well-regarded medical organizations created uncertainty whether
pedophilia should be characterized as a mental disorder or a
mental illness. 139 The issue was not (as is the case with the
abortion-mental health link) whether there was any reliable evidence
that a condition existed at all." 0 Thus, though the legislature certainly
has leeway to establish statutes that affect the medical profession, it
should not be acceptable for legislatures to create statutes based on
scientific precepts that are not recognized by at least a reasonable
portion of the medical community.141
Patients count on their physicians to provide accurate, objective
information regarding their care. A statute like the one in South
Dakota not only makes it impossible for the public at large to receive
accurate medical information, but it also "undermines public trust that
professional physician speech will reflect the expertise of the
'medical community."'l 42 The physician serves as the patient's link to
07 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
138Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983).
1 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 375 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1401n addition, one author has noted that all of the cases cited in Carhart for the
proposition that legislatures may act in the face of medical uncertainty involve statutes that
allow civil commitment for convicted criminals. See Manian, supra note 47, at 264 n.247 ("It is
nonetheless disturbing that Carhart compares pregnant women seeking abortion to convicted
criminals in stating that these precedents support its decision."). Thus, at the very least, these
cases are distinguishable from those involving informed consent simply by virtue of their
drastically differing contexts.
141 See Dresser,supra note 32, at 1620 ("[A]lthough it is easy to speculate about physical
and psychological risks accompanying a variety of medical interventions, there must be a
reasonable evidentiary basis for such risks before doctors are required to wam patients about
them.").
142Post, supra note 37, at 979. Post further argues that such a mandate "strips
physician-patient communications of their unique authority and dependability, and in this way
jeopardizes the capacity of the medical profession to serve as a reservoir of expert knowledge
that can reliably be communicated to the public through physician-patient disclosures." Id. at
979-80.
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the medical information necessary to make informed decisions
regarding treatment and care, and it is the physician's duty to provide
that link. 14 3 Such an interaction is only possible, however, if the
physician provides information that is derived from a valid scientific
source rather than an outsider with a political agenda.
In addition to the burden it places on the physician-patient
relationship, there are a number of other reasons why it is inherently
unreasonable to require physicians to convey medical information
that does not have some significant factual basis in the scientific and
medical communities. For one, it is highly likely that such a
requirement would create significant First Amendment concerns by
improperly compelling physician speech. 1" In addition to lending
scientific credence to an unscientific finding, mandates such as those
requiring physicians to inform patients that abortion equates to
terminating the life of a human being "deliberately and provocatively
incorporate[] the language of ideological controversy and force[]
physicians to affirm the side of those who oppose abortion."l 4 5 Such
compelled disclosure of state ideology is impermissible, because
constitutionally, the state cannot force physicians to "disseminate an
ideology, no matter how acceptable to some," without violating
physicians' "First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for
such message."1

43
1 See Curfman, supra note 39, at 2485 ("Doctors have an ethical responsibility to provide
their patients with accurate medical information.").
44
1 See Lazzarini, supra note 122, at 2190.
145Post, supra note 37, at 956.
'6Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). Looking at the issue from the opposite
perspective, another author has argued for a First Amendment right against compelled listening.
See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The FirstAmendment Right Against Compelled Listening,
89 B.U. L. REv. 939 (2009). Corbin notes:

Compelled listening can interfere with individual autonomy in two distinct ways.
First, it interferes with the decision-makingprocess by not allowing adults to choose
what information to consider in developing their thoughts and making up their
minds. . . . Second, by forcing particular information onto unwilling listeners,
compelled listening can unduly influence the ultimate decision made.
Id. at 982. Corbin's proposal essentially extends the protections already provided against
intrusive private speech under the captive audience doctrine to statements by the government.
See id. at 980. Thus, in order to apply, the listener (1) must be unable to avoid the government's
speech, and (2) should not have to leave or otherwise take action to avoid hearing the
government's message. Id. at 980-81. According to Professor Corbin, "there is no question that
abortion-seeking women in South Dakota and Oklahoma would qualify as a captive audience in
terms of their physical inability to avoid the government's message." Id. at 1002. Not only are
these women captive to their medical condition, in that they must seek the assistance of a
medical professional in order to terminate their pregnancies, but they must actually certify that
they have received and digested the government's message regarding the procedure, which
makes it impossible to avoid hearing the speech. See id.
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Along with the compelled ideological speech concerns, Professor
Robert Post has also argued that, under an analysis roughly analogous
to the commercial speech doctrine, statutes requiring physicians to
disclose information of questionable scientific validity violate the
public's right to receive truthful and non-misleading information.147
As doctor-patient relationships, like commercial speech, help promote
more informed public decision making, First Amendment constraints
would prohibit legislatures from imposing mandates that individual
doctors provide false or misleading information, thereby protecting
the public's access to information.14 8 Theoretically, these constraints
should be triggered when the state either prohibits the physician from
disclosing accurate, nonmisleading information, or requires disclosure
of inaccurate or misleading information, such as the adverse mental
health effects mandated in the South Dakota statute.149
While it is clear that false and misleading statutes have significant
First Amendment implications150 and likely violate the undue burden
standard, there is still the problem of determining exactly when a
statute mandates the provision of such information. Such a
determination requires at least a preliminary evaluation of the
scientific merits of the disclosures. Unless courts begin to evaluate
underlying scientific precepts, they will continue to defer to
legislative determinations under the assumption that those findings
reflect current and accurate scientific knowledge.
The phrase "scientific knowledge" "implies a grounding in the
methods and procedures of science[,] . . . connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation[, . . . [and] must be

147For a complete discussion of this analogy, see Post, supra note 37. The commercial
speech doctrine protects the public's "First Amendment right to 'receive information and
ideas."' Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757
(1976). By their nature, commercial messages that are untrue or misleading to the public are not
protected under the doctrine, as they do not fulfill the goal of creating a better informed public.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
Such false statements simply have no constitutional value. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974). Thus, it is permissible for regulations of commercial speech to require
disclosure of "accurate information in the interests of promoting more educated consumers."
Post, supra
note 37, at 975.
48
s See Post, supra note 37, at 978-79. As Post argues, "the same First Amendment value
that underlies commercial speech doctrine is also present in professional physician speech
designed to convey the knowledge necessary for informed consent." Id. at 978. Thus, he
reasons, the First Amendment should logically protect "the circulation of accurate information
to the public in respect to both kinds of speech." Id.

149Id.
5oSee

at 979.

Dresser, supra note 32, at 1621; see also Corbin, supra note 146, at 1007-08 ("In
letting the state try to persuade women seeking abortions to change their minds, the Supreme
Court has allowed a degree of paternalism absent in traditional informed consent and forbidden
in all other speech cases.").
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derived by the scientific method."151 The Court made these
observations in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,152
which dealt with the admissibility of scientific evidence. 15 3 It is
useful, however, to apply similar principles when evaluating the
accuracy of statutes that require disclosure of scientific or medical
information.
Although Casey mandates that informed consent statutes must be
"truthful and not misleading,"l 54 it is not clear courts are willing to
delve deeply enough into the factual predicates of the statutes to
determine whether they actually meet that standard. Although this is
not likely to change after the Court's deferential approach in
155
Carhart,
such deference is not justified. On the contrary, courts
could utilize a modified Daubert analysis to determine whether the
purportedly scientific information mandated under an informed
consent statute meets Casey's enumerated standard. If judges have the
ability to shield juries from expert scientific testimony that does not
reach an appropriate standard of reliability, they are also arguably
equipped to shield patients from legislative mandates requiring
doctors to provide similarly unreliable information. Thus, statutes
based on findings that would not meet an appropriate standard of
evidentiary and scientific reliability under Daubert should not
withstand the truthful and nonmisleading standard.
Determining whether an expert's proposed testimony qualifies as
scientific knowledge "entails a preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue." 56 As the New England Journal of
Medicine noted in its amicus brief in Daubert:
"Good science" is a commonly accepted term used to
describe the scientific community's system of quality control
which protects the community and those who rely upon it
from unsubstantiated scientific analysis. It mandates that each

151
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
152 509 U.S. 579.
53
1 Id. at 590 ("Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e.,

'good grounds,' based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony
pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.").
154Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
55
1 See generally Gordon, supra note 9 (discussing how the Carhart decision may inspire
states to expand their informed consent requirements).
'5 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
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proposition undergo a rigorous trilogy of publication,
replication and verification before it is relied upon.15 7
As under Daubert, a court evaluating an informed consent statute
could assess a variety of factors to determine whether the information
is sufficiently reliable to support a mandate requiring doctors to share
it with their patients. These factors include: (1) whether the theory or
technique is testable, and whether such tests have occurred,158 (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication, and (3) whether there is widespread acceptance within
the medical community.159 These factors are by no means exclusive,
and courts are free to use other measures to discern the reliability of a
scientific proposition.' Such approaches could include "pre-trial
colloquia" between judges and experts, neutral experts serving in an
advisory capacity, and references to an established and reputable
scientific organization, such as the National Academy of Sciences or
the Centers for Disease Control. 161 Training through programs
provided by organizations like ASTAR would also be useful in this
context.162
Courts would also be wise to look beyond peer-review of medical
research to potential sources of bias,163 particularly in contentious
areas like abortion law. At a minimum, courts should require some
sort of conflict disclosure by all experts testifying about these
issues.M This would help courts to identify studies that deserve closer
5 Brief of the New England Journal of Medicine et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 2, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (No. 92-102), quoted in Paul Giannelli, The Daubert
Trilogy and the Law of Expert Testimony, in EVIDENCE STORIES 181, 190 (Richard Lempart ed.,
2006).
15 8Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 ("Scientific methodology today is based on generating
hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what
distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry." (quoting E. GREEN & C. NESSON,
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EvIDENCE 645 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
15 Though Daubertdoes not find widespread acceptance of a theory to be dispositive as to
its evidentiary reliability, the Court does note that "a known technique which has been able to
attract only minimal support within the community may properly be viewed with skepticism."
Id. at 594 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
'6oSee Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in the
Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REv. 715, 798-800
(1994).
161Id. at 792-97.
62
1 See Sorrel, supra note 136 and accompanying text.
16 3 See generally Mark R. Patterson, Conflicts ofInterest in Scientific Expert Testimony, 40
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1313 (1999) (describing bias as an element of reliability, as well as its
ability to corrupt scientific research).
64
' See id. at 1336-45 (describing the policy of scientific journals to require conflict
disclosures); see also Wendy E. Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies
Through the Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 589, 615-16 (2004) (discussing the
problem of bias in "policy-relevant scientific research").
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scrutiny, both in terms of methodology and overall reliability.165
Peer-review, after all, is by no means a fail-safe. 166 When parties try
to use peer-review as a means to bolster or discredit scientific
evidence, courts can and should look beyond the mere mention of the
journal name and examine the circumstances of the peer review.167
In the informed consent context, all of this information could help
courts determine whether the legislature has justifiably relied upon
the scientific precepts behind its mandate, and ultimately whether the
sum of the scientific evidence sufficiently supports the informed
consent requirement. Legislative findings used to support the creation
of the statute would greatly facilitate such a review, as much of the
information requiring assessment under the Daubert standard is often
presented and evaluated in the process of creating the law. Such
findings could at least provide a starting point for judicial analysis,
allowing a court to evaluate the factual bases underlying the resulting
regulation.168 Beyond the legislative findings, the amicus briefs and
additional expert testimony proffered in a case that challenges the
constitutionality of an informed consent statute could supplement the
information and provide courts with a more complete picture of the
available scientific evidence on a particular issue. This would, in turn,
allow the court to better determine whether the legislature reasonably
used the available science to create the statute. 169
65
' See Patterson, supra note 163, at 1386 (stating that "[t]his approach will determine
whether the bias had any concrete effects"); Wagner, supra note 164, at 617 (arguing that "these
conflict disclosures need not be used to disqualify research or testimony, but they could provide
critical information about potential sources of bias that might otherwise be missed").
166
See, e.g., Keith J. Winstein & David Armstrong, Top PainScientist FabricatedData in
Studies, HospitalSays, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at A12 (detailing the recent discovery that a
prominent pain scientist fabricated twenty-one medical studies to demonstrate alleged benefits
of certain painkillers, as well as the recent retraction of those studies from well-respected
medical journals).
167
See Patterson,supra note 163, at 1391 (arguing that courts can look to the quality of the
review, including biases of the researcher and the journal tier in which the publication
occurred).
168
Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (stating that while findings are not
required, they are often helpful). Contrary to Congress's statement in the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act that it is entitled to judicial deference with regard to its findings, see Pub. L. No.
108-105, § 2(8), 117 Stat. 1201, 1202 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §1531 (2006)), courts are
not required to turn a blind eye. In United States v. Morrison, for example, despite numerous
legislative findings, the Court did not defer to congressional fact-finding for the Violence
Against Women Act, which asserted link a between gender violence and interstate commerce to
justify congressional regulation. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
1o As it happens, the exhaustive district court opinions overturning the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, later upheld in Carhart,illustrate the courts' ability to undertake this type of
review. See discussion supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331
F. Supp. 2d 805, 1007 (D. Neb. 2004) (noting that the district courts may take "additional
evidence to decide the reasonableness of the congressional fact finding"); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n
v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (asserting that the court does not
necessarily have to defer to congressional fact finding when the reasonableness of the facts is in
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The legislative findings used to support the statute at issue in
Rounds provide a useful illustration as to how such an analysis might
begin. In creating the statute, the South Dakota legislature utilized the
findings presented in the South Dakota Task Force to Study
Abortion.o70 The report made a number of "scientific" findings that
have readily apparent flaws in reasoning. First, the report concludes,
"scientific facts and information . . . establish the fact that abortion

terminates the life of a human being" and that this is
"indisputable." 17 1 Second, the findings were heavily reliant on the
individual affidavits of hundreds of pro-life advocates from a group
known as Operation Outcry, all of whom claimed to have been
coerced into having an abortion and to have suffered severe
psychological consequences as a result. 172 Finally, the only
supplements to the affiants' claims of mental health risks were
citations to studies that were either rated in the Johns Hopkins study
as having poor methodology (e.g., a number of the studies by Cougle,
Reardon, and Coleman upon which the Task Force heavily relies) or
by the APA Report'73 as being unreliable.174
The Task Force Report does not address any of the studies that the
Johns Hopkins researchers and the APA later identified as most
methodologically sound, all of which present a conflicting view on
the link between mental health and abortion. What is more, the Task

question); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1006 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (observing that the Supreme Court has allowed district courts to look at additional
evidence when determining the reasonableness of congressional fact finding).
170REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION (2005), available

at http://www.dakotavoice.com/Docs/South%20Dakota%20Abortion%2OTask%20Force%20
Report.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].

171
Id. at 11. The report relies on advances in scientific techniques, such as polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) and DNA fingerprinting, to support the Task Force's belief in the
"wholeness and uniqueness of every human being from conception." Id. at 25. Under this
method of reasoning, a run-of-the-mill tissue culture in a petri dish could be deemed a complete
human being. The Task Force also cited some researchers' reluctance to answer the question of
when life begins (because of their belief that it would merely be opinion) as a lack of credible
evidence
against the "scientific fact" that abortion terminates a human being. Id. at 12.
72
1 See Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1652 (2008); see also TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 170, at 21 (highlighting the testimonies given by women regarding
their abortion experiences); Dresser, supra note 32, at 1618 (stating that disclosure of such
anecdotal reports has never been required by the informed consent doctrine, and that these
individual reports are "insufficient to establish a causal link" under the standards of
contemporary
medicine).
3
11
See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (discussing the studies' findings).
1
74 Compare TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 170, at 41-46 (citing these studies with
approval), with Charles et al., supra note 86, at 440-44 (comparing the methodology and
strength of several studies), and MAJOR, supra note 86, at 26-27 (critiquing the validity of
several abortion-related psychological studies).
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Force writes off the positions of three objective and well-respected
organizations regarding possible side effects of abortion. In response
to the APA's statement that abortion has no lasting or significant
mental health risks, the Task Force states, without foundation, that
"the APA's position does not represent that of the majority of its
membership, but rather, the opinions of a group of members on
various committees of interest."1 75 The report proceeds to further
question the APA's findings on ideological grounds, and ultimately
chooses to ignore them altogether. 176 The Task Force entirely
disregards the similar position set forth by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), simply stating its
disagreement with ACOG "due to other testimony and materials"
presented to the Task Force. 177 It makes no attempt to reconcile the
conflicting data. Perhaps most audaciously, the Task Force questions
the reliability of abortion mortality statistics issued by the Centers for
Disease Control, noting that the CDC is "not funded, or under any
mandate, to obtain comprehensive and accurate data on deaths due to
abortion."' 78 In short, despite the slew of data the Task Force had, or
should have had, regarding the non-existence of a mental health
detriment due to abortion, it concluded that:
[I]t is simply unrealistic to expect that a pregnant mother is
capable of being involved in the termination of the life of her
own child without risk of suffering significant psychological
trauma and distress. To do so is beyond the normal, natural,
and healthy capability of a woman whose natural instincts are
to protect and nurture her child. 79
Thus, judging simply by the Report itself, serious questions arise
raised as to the reliability of the evidence used to support the statute's
mandated disclosures. The statement of Dr. Marty Allison, a pro-life
advocate and chairwoman of the Task Force, raises further doubts
regarding the legitimacy of the Task Force Report, as she later
commented that the findings were unscientific and slanted. 8 0 In
describing the process of creating the Report, Dr. Allison detailed
'" TASK FORCE REPORT,
7

6Id. at 46-47.
77Id. at 48.
78

supra note 170, at 46.

1 Id. at 49. The Task Force further notes that the statistics are underinclusive because they
"do not include the vast majority of deaths due to abortions because they do not include deaths
from suicide ... and deaths due to any of the cancers in which abortions may be a significant
contributing factor." Id. As noted above, there is significant scientific data to suggest neither of
these "causes of death due to abortion" is legitimate.
79
Id. at 47-48.
so See Marty L. Allison, My View, 59 S.D. MED. 310,310 (2006).
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proceedings that were generally one-sided, as opposed to pro-choice
and pro-life advocates working together to analyze scientific,
objective information.' 8 1 She further disclosed that the Task Force
"voted down a motion to only accept data that is consistent with
current medical science and based on findings obtained through the
most rigorous and objective scientific studies."' 82 She concluded that
the Report is "not based on sound scientific research" and contains
"misleading, and in some areas, completely false information."1
After considering the legislative findings, a court could look to
additional expert testimony and amicus briefs to fill in the gaps and
determine the basis behind the legislative position. Where, as here,
the bulk of the evidence demonstrates either (1) a medical consensus
that goes against the terms of the statute or (2) that the legislature
failed to adequately use the available reliable scientific information,
the court should impose an injunction until the statute's deficiencies
are adequately corrected and the law takes into account the best
available scientific evidence. The whole issue of judicial review, of
course, could be avoided if legislators would allow doctors to exercise
independent judgment when deciding upon specific disclosures.
When specific disclosures are legislatively required, however, the
court has a responsibility to ensure that they contain a factual basis in
science. 1
Admittedly, there are some limitations to this approach. For one, it
would require significant time and expense for courts to adequately
sift through the available evidence to make a determination.185
Second, there is also likely to be a certain amount of "difficulty in
finding neutral experts,"18 6 especially in contentious areas like
abortion. Finally, courts could get the scientific assessment wrong,
which would adversely affect their credibility.187 This last limitation
181

Id

182Id

183Id.
8

On remand, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota determined that the

scientific consensus against the risk disclosures in the statute was sufficient to outweigh the
limited evidence presented by those defending the statute. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D.,
S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (D.S.D. 2009) ("Defendants rely on their experts'
opinions and five limited studies to show an association between suicide ideation and abortions.
Defendants have produced no evidence, however, to show that it is generally recognized that
having85an abortion causes an increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.").
' This is not an insurmountable problem, however. See McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note
129, at 126 ("Delay is simply the price of more accurate and fair fact-finding, and given that
social facts constitute precedents no less binding than legal interpretations, the additional cost of
delay to the particular parties in the case are likely to be outweighed by the advantages to
society as a whole.").
'86Black et al., supra note 160, at 800.
'87See Wagner, supra note 164, at 599 (discussing the potential problems if courts
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will also result, however, when legislatures misuse information. In
those cases, deliberate legislative misuse will presumably create
additional skepticism and have an even more damaging reputational
effect in the eyes of the scientific community.
Although some might argue that such a review requires courts to
invade the policy judgments that properly fall within the province of
the legislature, this is not the case. The proposed review looks only at
whether the statutes have an appropriate factual basis. Where such a
basis exists, a court should not make any judgment as to the propriety
or desirability of the statute. If the basis does not exist, the statute is
in violation of Casey's truthful and nonmisleading mandate, and a
court has a constitutional obligation to intervene.
In sum, though admittedly imperfect, a less deferential look at
statutes that so directly affect what doctors do and say with their
patients is necessary to ensure a reasonable degree of scientific
validity. At the very least, such an approach could prevent the
enforcement of some of the more egregious statutes that are most
likely to adversely affect the physician-patient relationship. With
luck, it could also restore some integrity to the informed consent
process by preventing legislative imposition on the physician-patient
relationship in areas where it does not belong.
CONCLUSION

Using unsound medical information disguised as informed consent
in order to serve the legislative objective of steering patients toward a
particular treatment flies is the antithesis of the historical purpose of
informed consent. Determining the appropriate course of care is
ideally a matter for the physician and the patient to decide in the
privacy of the doctor's office. Physicians are simply in a better
position than either legislatures or courts to appropriately implement
the informed consent process.188 Mechanical, non-personalized, and
sometimes medically unfounded statutes mandating the content of
these discussions are not a viable solution for protecting patients."

improperly apply scientific arguments).
88See Tobin, supra note 124, at 150-51 (noting that doctors are "in a much better position
than legislatures or health departments to translate informed consent principles into concrete
statements, especially when the science involved is controversial or rapidly developing").
'See Andersen-Watts, supra note 6, at 221-22 ("We ought to be concerned about this
legislation in terms of its ministerial costs, increased strain on the physician-patient relationship,
and lack of efficacy in terms of decision-making habits of breast cancer patients."). Such
concerns also stretch to similar legislation involving specific informed consent requirements in
other treatment contexts.

238

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 1

These statutes merely exchange the original paternalism that plagued
the doctor-patient relationship for another form, replacing the
physician's decision making with the legislature's. 190 In either case,
the patient's autonomy suffers. While improving the physician-patient
relationship is a noble goal, many current specific statutory
requirements are incapable of helping either doctors or patients
toward this end. 19 1 In fact, paradoxically, "these mandates often do
little to further the underlying values of the [informed] consent
process, and sometimes are even directly at odds with them."1 9 2
The problems with specific informed consent statutes are
compounded when their scientific accuracy is questionable. Under
these circumstances the statutes go from merely undesirable to
potentially unconstitutional. As one author questioned, "[i]f
legislatures can mandate that physicians provide women with
ideological, vague, intimidating, and false information about abortion,
what is to stop them from intruding further into physician-patient
discussions regarding end-of-life decisions,

. .

. the efficacy of birth

control, or the role of condoms in preventing sexually transmitted
infections?"193
At best, specific informed consent statutes are a beneficent, but
misguided, attempt by legislators to produce a better-informed
populace. Recently, however, these statutes more often embody
deliberate attempts to manipulate women using morality disguised as
legitimate science. If lawmakers insist on legislating informed
consent to this degree, they must maintain the scientific integrity of
the information. Such action is not only necessary to uphold the ideals
of informed consent but more importantly, "it is a matter of sound
public health policy."1 94 As the researchers in the Johns Hopkins
study concluded, "[i]f the goal is to help women, we are obligated to

1
9Id. at 222. ("Trading one paternalism for another will not help matters; especially not a
paternalism that disregards scientific data about decision-making and exists outside the realm of
medical treatment.").
191Id; see also Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health
Care, 14 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 245,274 (2000) ("In reality, the law has done
little to move actual medical practice closer to the ideal of shared decision-making between
physician and patient. Too often, law has been used only to cover the doctor-patient relationship
with bureaucratic red tape." (footnote omitted)).
192Gold & Nash, supra note 8, at 7.
93
I
Lazzarini,
supra note 122, at 2191.
14Richardson & Nash, supra note 7, at 11 (noting the obligations of state and federal
policymakers in this area, and stating that "holding policymakers accountable to these
informed-consent obligations may be an uphill battle, but it is no less urgent for being so"); see
also McKenzie, supra note 14, at 273 (stating that "[i]f policy makers fail to rely on
internationally agreed upon scientific facts . .. public policy will continue to be irresponsibly
based on mere fantasies and wishful thinking" (citing Dr. Dianne Irving)).
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base program and policy recommendations on the best science, rather
than using science to advance political agenda."' 95
Though for better or worse, it has been established that a state may
express a preference for childbirth over abortion, the Supreme Court
has not made it acceptable to express this preference through "the
provision of medically inaccurate information that effectively could
negate a woman's ability to make an informed decision regarding her
own life and health."l96 Thus, when legislatures insist upon creating
specific informed consent statutes, they must base their laws on
objective science, not mere speculation or political ideology.
Moreover, when legislators do venture into the realm of medicine,
courts must serve as a more stringent check to prevent constitutional
violations, especially in areas like abortion. Uncritical deference to
legislative factual determinations is simply not enough. Medicine
demands a more exacting standard, and the integrity of informed
consent and the physician-patient relationship depends on it.
AMANDA MCMURRAY ROEt

19Charles et al., supra note 86, at 449.
19 Richardson & Nash, supra note 7, at 11.
'9See Dresser, supra note 32, at 1620 ("[A]lthough it is easy to speculate about physical
and psychological risks accompanying a variety of medical interventions, there must be a
reasonable evidentiary basis for such risks before doctors are required to warn patients about
them.").
t J.D. Candidate 2010, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

